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This paper discusses the increasingly important roles of Asian official institutions in the new 
global financial landscape and the reasons that have led to the build-up of massive public 
surpluses. We re-examine the role of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as the de facto "global 
lender of last resort" during the recent  financial crisis. Specifically, we analyze SWFs’ 
balance sheet characteristics, target allocations strategies, strategic agendas and political 
realities, management philosophies, and other real-world challenges, both before and after 
the crisis. Part of our analysis incorporates data which includes announced deals, regulatory 
filings, balance sheet information, and actual performance data made available by specific 
SWFs. We also point out a logical inconsistency in the common application of the Berk-
Green alpha argument to the management of SWFs. For instance, the recent work done by 
Ang, Goetzmann, and Schaefer (2009) suggests limited or no evidence that alpha-seeking 
activities have impacts on SWF performance. We argue that the problem may be partially 
due to the choice of an appropriate performance benchmark for such large, non-commercial 
mandates. Finally, we propose a set of principles to construct a fair performance benchmark 
for SWFs. 
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1.  ROLES OF ASIAN OFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NEW 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE 
Since the onset of the  financial  crisis, the helpful questions no longer revolve around 
whether Asia is important or when Asia will become a global financial powerhouse. The 
practical and pressing agenda of the moment is how to further integrate a now-confident 
Asia into the global financial system in a constructive and mutually beneficial manner. Many 
of the regional-level issues as identified by the June 2010 joint Asian Development Bank 
(ADB)-Earth Institute report (Sachs, Kawai, Lee, and Woo 2010) have been known for some 
time. Surprisingly, research and policy literature that offers pragmatic roadmaps and rigorous 
solutions is only beginning to emerge. This paper aims to summarize the issues and to make 
an initial attempt to answer some of the pressing questions. 
1.1  Historical Reasons for the Build-Up of Large Public Surpluses 
To understand sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), we must first understand the historical 
context that has precipitated the massive build-up of large public surpluses. Generally 
speaking, sovereign wealth funds fall into two categories: i) funds that aim to convert 
physical wealth (often mineral wealth) into financial wealth and preserve such wealth in a 
trust format for the benefit of multiple generations; and ii) funds that manage pools of excess 
reserves used to support domestic currencies in order to ensure financial stability, as well as 
provide for some level of fiscal contingency. 
The existence of the first type of SWF is an historical artifact: SWFs offer, from a national 
balance sheet perspective, a mechanism for diversification away from over-concentration in 
mineral wealth. This wealth can then be managed in a trust format for the benefit of multiple 
generations, and the infamous Dutch disease
1
Let us imagine the following hypothetical scenario: foreign exchange markets are reasonably 
efficient. There is no capital control. Producers in exporting countries are allowed to invest 
their surpluses into hard assets held by or located in importer countries. Importer countries 
(typically with greying populations) in turn pay for their imports by liquidating hard assets. 
Under such a scenario, any large export-driven trade surpluses will be counterbalanced by 
investment outflows, and there is no obvious reason for  a massive build-up of official 
reserves. Is there anything inherently wrong with  such a scenario, as long as domestic 
investors are reasonably sophisticated about investing overseas, and the state still has some 
financial reserves to use both as a precautionary measure and a way to diversify the 
economy? Also, in which other ways is the world deviating from this hypothetical scenario, 
ways  which  have  led to the build-up of massive public surpluses and the associated 
distortions in the global balance of payments, besides in the manner laid out in  typical 
 thereby avoided. The existence of the second 
type of SWF deserves more scrutiny. If foreign exchange markets are perfectly efficient then 
classical theories of international economics and comparative advantage suggest that no 
country should run up consistent trade surpluses and build up massive official reserves. 
When a net exporter's goods and currency  become more expensive, due to eventual 
demand pressures, the importer may find domestic goods become relatively cheaper, or the 
exporter may begin investing surpluses into production activities inside the importer country 
in order to meet demand with lower production costs. This point leads some commentators 
to suggest that the real cause of the build-up of massive imbalance is the lack of flexibility in 
certain segments of the global exchange rate regime. 
                                                 
1 The Dutch disease refers to the phenomena that the revenue from selling a country’s natural resources will 
make the nation’s currency stronger, therefore, making exports more expensive and eventually hurting the 
manufacture sector. The term was first used by the Economist (“The Dutch Disease” (November 26, 1977). 
The Economist, pp. 82–83.) ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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arguments  regarding  inefficient foreign exchange markets and inflexible exchange rate 
regimes? 
1.2  A Consequence of Failed Market Liberalization? 
In one of the most celebrated arguments against unfettered liberalization, Stiglitz, Ocampo, 
Spiegel, and French-Davis (2006) argue that the Washington Consensus has placed 
unwarranted faith in the role of markets. The authors further argue that structural policies, 
such as capital market liberalization, are blunt instruments that have often been 
implemented with adverse consequences for economic stability and long-term growth. 
Global imbalances of payments are unlikely to disappear overnight by any capital market 
liberalization measures. Further, such imbalances of payments have created serious 
consequences for the global economy and will continue to do so for some time. For one 
thing, the massive public surpluses among Asian countries have allowed certain 
governments to run unsustainable fiscal deficits. Moreover, Asian countries still have fresh 
memories of their own financial crisis in the 1990s, when certain governments in the region 
ran out of official reserves to support their own currencies. Because the potential social and 
economic costs of a financial rescue can be traumatic, few Asian countries nowadays want 
to entertain the remote possibility of insolvency, no matter how much more efficient foreign 
exchange markets have become. The practical policy question now is not whether Asian 
countries should build up “rainy day” public surpluses, but rather how much is enough, and 
at which point does the size become too massive and create more problems of distortion 
than it solves? 
In theory, every country in the world can print a certain amount of domestic currency and 
exchange it for foreign currencies in order to build up an official reserve. These pools can be 
used by each central bank to facilitate more efficient settlements of day-to-day cross-border 
transactions. As long as these pools of official reserves are kept away from general 
circulation in the real economy—in the past, official reserves have usually been invested 
only in government bonds—the act of printing money to create such pools should have 
limited inflationary impacts on domestic economies as governments are simply holding each 
other's bonds. What might be a reasonable operational size for such artificial pools? One 
may argue that a “virtual” arrangement as such, in the form of a bilateral currency swap 
facility, already exists today. Under such an arrangement, there is no obvious reason to draw 
any amount (from the swap line) larger than what would be necessary for aggregated 
settlements of day-to-day transactions, so that the practical operational size of such pools 
can be determined empirically.2
The real problem with the simplistic model described above is that some debtor 
governments may decide to use the money raised from selling bonds to other central banks 
to finance their own massive fiscal deficits. This is, in effect, equivalent to one country in the 
model above “selling down” its reserves unilaterally, and doing so can result in monetary 
expansion in the real economy. In this case, all other countries will end up with a higher-
than-warranted allocation of that country's currencies in their respective pools. Further, the 
net-saver countries in the above model may also decide to use their reserves to invest in 
tangible assets instead of holding government bonds, i.e., the pools in the model above 
become an increasingly significant part of the real economy. At which point will these 
economies begin to face a real risk of the Dutch disease? 
 
At the end of the day, there may be some natural and logical reasons for every major region 
of the world to maintain a pool of official reserves in currencies other than their own. The 
recent Greek crisis has also shown that the Euro does not yet offer a credible alternative to 
                                                 
2 One example is the recent announcement by the People's Bank of China and the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore to set up a bilateral currency swap facility for the purpose of promoting bilateral trade and direct 
investment.  ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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the United States (US) dollar as a reserve currency. Unless Asian countries begin to use a 
specific Asian currency or a basket of Asian currencies as the region's anchor currency, it is 
far from clear what credible alternatives there are for central banks around the world to stop 
using the US dollar as their primary store of value. Another practical issue with this simplistic 
model is that there is no credible Asian currency or currency basket for non-Asian central 
banks to hold, while Asian countries are “stuck” with using US dollars as their primary store 
of value. As a  consequence, the one-way build-up of massive dollar-dominated public 
surpluses in Asia will remain an economic fact of life into the foreseeable future. 
1.3  Beyond Wealth Preservation and Stabilization of Domestic 
Economies 
At the height of the recent financial  crisis, many Western financial institutions at risk of 
collapsing sought help from Asian official institutions to finance their rescue packages. 
Estimates of  the total amount of recapitalization required to restore the global financial 
system to its former (pre-Basel-II) state of health are roughly in the trillion-dollar range (Lee 
2009). Given that only the Asian official institutions will have balance sheets large enough to 
supply such an astronomical amount of capital, they are expected to play a critical role in the 
recapitalization of the global financial system. There are practical advantages in defining 
such  a  role for Asian official institutions, as well as the potential responsibilities and 
obligations involved. It is often impossible for any rescuer to time its intervention at the 
precise bottom of a collapsing stock market. The public is also not known for making 
charitable comparisons  to the proverbial alternative of “doing nothing”, so the ensuing 
market volatility often leads to a public outcry about the “misuse” of public coffers by the 
rescuers. Finally, certain basic criteria must be met before launching any rescue—unlike the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)  Executive Board, a collection of independent Asian 
official institutions may not all agree on how best to make certain difficult choices between 
moral hazards and long-term economic malaise. 
From an institutional perspective, there are also practical reasons for Asian SWFs to better 
define their de facto role as global lenders of last resort, beyond their established role of 
providing stability for their own domestic economies. Later in the paper, we will reference 
research that suggests evidence of limited alpha
3
 
 being available to SWFs: indeed, their 
returns are thought to be driven primarily by asset allocation. An SWF also cannot engage in 
typical trading-oriented hedging activities because the notional amount that they would be 
required to take short positions in may be large enough to crash the market, thereby 
defeating the purpose of the hedge. As a result, one pragmatic hedging technique that can 
be pursued by an SWF is to act as the global lender of last resort, in order to avoid any 
potential collapse of the global economy. This is still a better alternative to holding worthless 
IOUs: usually, net-saver countries have no interest in seeing their customers stop buying 
their goods and services, at least not before the appropriate adjustments have been made. 
In other words, it is conceivable for mega-sized, public investors in Asia to play a stabilizing 
role in the global financial system. In fact, Hu Xiaolian, Deputy Governor of the People's 
Bank of China, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) central bank, proposed the 
possible creation of a “superfund” with dual market stabilization and profit-seeking objectives 
(Hu 2009). This kind of structure would allow Asian official institutions to herald the reform of 
financial markets and their regulations, however  many have good reason to be wary of 
potential domination by a single country or a handful of countries. These are some of the 
pragmatic policy issues that will be explored and expanded on in this paper, and which 
should also form the subject of future research. 
                                                 
3 Alpha usually refers to the risk-adjusted abnormal, non-systematic return from factor models, such as the 





2.  INVESTMENT PURPOSES OF SWFS AS MANAGERS OF 
LARGE PUBLIC SURPLUSES 
2.1  Optimal Portfolio Strategies 
Research in optimal portfolio strategies by Merton (1998) describes how long-term wealth 
managers should consider not only contemporaneous asset holdings, but also the potential 
substitution effects that arise from anticipated inflow and outflow characteristics. Lee (2006) 
expanded on Merton’s basic model in order to better understand optimal asset allocation 
from a national balance sheet perspective, with the assumption that the global economy is 
populated by three types of countries (Figure 1): 
 1.   Group A—Countries with abundant natural resources;  
2.  Group B—Countries  with  abundant productive labor that  favor the production of 
manufactured goods; and  
3.    Group C—Countries  with  abundant intangible assets, such as intellectual property, 
scientific and technical leadership, high value-added managerial skills, and capital market 
expertise in, for example, stock markets, hedge funds, and venture capital investments.  
 





Figure 1: Model of Country Types in the Global Economy 
 
 
Source: Lee (2006) 
2.2  Types of SWFs 
Lee (2006) further assumed that one dominant country in Group C issues the major trade 
settlement currency in this global economy. Lee was able to demonstrate by analysis using 
empirical examples how each of these country groupings would choose the following asset 
allocation policy responses: 
1.   Group A—These resource-rich countries are naturally “long” resources and “long” the 
settlement currency (as a result of selling their natural resources). Their appropriate 
diversification policy is to sell resources forward and invest their settlement currency 
reserves by buying manufacturing goods and intangible assets.  
2.   Group B—These manufacturing powerhouses are naturally “short” resources and “long” 
the settlement currency (as a result of producing and selling their manufacturing goods). 
Their appropriate diversification policy is to buy resources as well as intangible assets.  
3.   Group C—The primary “exports” of these countries are intangible assets, such as equity 
and debt papers. Their appropriate diversification policy is to develop more value-added 
services (and hence intangible assets) that correlate with resources and manufacturing. An 
example could be to develop advanced oil/gas services sectors and expertise in managing 
the complex logistics of global manufacturing.  
What is still missing from the above  analysis is the potential impact of immigration and 
knowledge transfer—in particular the flow of skills and expertise from Group C countries to 
Group A and B countries,  which results in  the distinctions between  groups A, B, and C 
becoming  increasingly blurred. That there will be Group A and Group B countries ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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accumulating large public surpluses to invest in debt and equity papers issued by Group C 
countries is a natural outcome of this model. The picture portrayed above works well until 
one of the following breakpoints are reached: i) certain Group A countries start running low 
in natural resources; or ii) certain Group C countries start running into a crisis of market 
confidence. Group  B countries are in a slightly more enviable position because 
manufacturing can always be retooled (despite the costs involved) and there will always be a 
minimum level of demand for certain manufactured goods. By comparison, the available 
corrective actions may be relatively limited when natural resources are depleted or when the 
market no longer has confidence in the valuation of certain types of intangible assets. 
2.3  Real-World Challenges 
The most common challenges faced by typical Group A countries, especially those in the 
Middle East, are shortages in intellectual capital and other means of production outside of 
mineral wealth extraction. The Dubai experience has shown that using massive wealth to 
buy talents from around the world does not necessarily result in a transfer of skills and 
knowledge to the local economy. Their policy challenge is to avoid wasteful spending and 
over-reliance on one or two sectors (such as property) which may eventually grind to a halt 
when generous financing runs out, as a result of exogenous factors such as the commodity 
price cycle. 
For those export-driven manufacturing economies expecting US dollar-based receipts while 
importing commodities as raw materials, their practical policy goals are to reinvest US dollar 
receipts into hard assets such as commodities while capturing knowledge for the creation of 
value-adding intangible assets, so as to develop other options to acquire such assets other 
than buying them from foreign countries. The PRC's long-term oil deals with Kazakhstan and 
the private equity nature of resource-related deals sought by the China-Africa Development 
Fund are examples of such policies. 
As mentioned, the most significant monetary expansionary pressure may come from debtor 
governments deciding to use the funds raised from the selling of bonds to other central 
banks to finance massive fiscal deficits. By contrast, when investments are well directed to 
productive foreign sectors or complementary domestic sectors, and only a relatively modest 
portion of the total official reserves are used in SWF-like investments, there is no obvious 
historical evidence suggesting any automatic increase in the risk of developing the Dutch 
disease. 
Ang, Goetzmann, and Schaefer (2009) compiled a detailed analysis based on the historical 
return patterns of Norway’s SWF, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund—Global—and 
found limited evidence (if any) that Norway has benefited from any alpha-seeking activities. 
The fund's returns appear to be driven primarily by asset allocation. This observation is 
consistent with theories on the overcrowding of “alpha”, in that state investors at sizes 
comparable to the whole market cannot be expected to significantly outperform the market 
itself. However, later in this paper, we will point out a potential weakness in this argument 
when applied to SWFs. 
In summary, there are only so many alpha-seeking activities that an SWF can meaningfully 
engage in (either domestically or internationally) without increasing the risk of the  Dutch 
disease. So far, such activities appear to have relatively insignificant impacts on the 
performances of SWF portfolios. Since SWF returns are primarily driven by asset allocation, 
the focus of our analysis in the remaining sections will be on the potential impact of taking 
portions of the money originally intended for the purchase of foreign government bonds by 
central banks and allocating  them to non-government  bond markets such as equities, 
commodities, and real estate. ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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3.  IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON SWFS 
3.1  Impact of the Financial Crisis on Asian Official Reserves 
Emerging Asian countries' official reserves come mainly from foreign exchange purchases 
made by their central banks. Official reserves have quadrupled since the end of the 1997 
financial crisis and reached the equivalent of about 5% of global gross domestic product 
(GDP) (in nominal terms) at the end of 2007 (IMF 2009). This leads to the natural question of 
whether the aggregate pool of official reserves is proportional to what  is required for 
precautionary purposes. Traditional measures of reserve adequacy include the ratio of 
reserves to short-term external debts, the reserves-to-M2
4
In a separate IMF report, however, Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil (2008) suggested the contrary. 
The authors argued that much of the increase in Asia's foreign reserves can be explained by 
an optimal insurance model under which the reserves serve as a steady source of liquidity to 
cushion the impact of sudden changes in capital flows. Their paper shows that the large 
build-ups of foreign currency reserves in the majority of Asian countries, with the exception 
of the PRC, is actually not too high and that these countries can benefit from higher reserves 
in terms of reduced borrowing costs. 
 ratio, and the number of months 
of imports that reserves can pay for. Using these measures, Park (2008a) argued that Asia's 
reserves have far exceeded the levels adequate for insurance purposes. 
During the 1997 financial crisis, Asian countries' foreign currency reserves experienced a 
sharp decline as shown in Figure 2, below. 
 
                                                 
4 M2 refers to money and quasi money that comprise the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other 
than those of the central government. Reserves comprise holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, 




Figure 2: Changes in Emerging Asia’s Foreign Exchange Reserves, Jan 2007–Mar 
2009 (year-on-year percentage change) 
 
      
The sharp decline in reserves can be explained by two reasons. First, certain US fixed 
income securities previously thought to have implied guarantees from the US Government 
experienced a temporary price shock, however, eventually many of them bounced back as 
the uncertainty dissipated. Second, the relative strength of the US dollar as a safe-haven 
currency during this period also created a dramatic markdown of the  non-dollar-based 
assets held by certain central banks. 
3.2  Post-Crisis Roles of Asian SWFs 
Whether the amount of Asian official reserves is sufficient in thepost-crisis period remains an 
open question. Moreover, readers should note that only a handful of Asian countries have 
reserves large enough to invest excess amounts (over and above what is necessary for 
precautionary purposes) in SWFs, which typically aim for higher returns than government 
bond yields by investing in “non-risk-free” assets. Finally, many of these SWFs experienced 
dramatic drawdowns and then subsequent bounce-backs. Some SWFs learned the hard 
way that there could be heavy political costs when facing massive drawdowns, regardless of 
whether the drawdowns were within expectations or whether the funds were successful in 




In the run-up to the financial crisis, a key factor contributing to significant surpluses/deficits in 
the global balance of payments  was  inflexible exchange rate policy. The persistent 
imbalance has in turn allowed certain countries to run unsustainable fiscal policies. The 
resulting negative feedback cycle may have gone too far and on for too long to allow for 
effective correction by monetary policies and other relevant forms of policy cooperation. In a 
way, the very existence of SWFs is a by-product of this seemingly unhealthy phenomenon. 
The pragmatic issue at hand is how one can practically get out of this quagmire. In order to 
make the necessary adjustments to the global balance of payments, there must be a viable 
alternative to what has effectively  been a regime of pegged currencies in Asia. This  is 
particularly true for the PRC. Even a hint of slowing in its purchase of an ever-growing 
stockpile of US Treasury securities can send Treasury prices tumbling. This situation cannot 
be sustained forever without a potential debasement of the US dollar, which is hardly in the 
interests of either the US or the PRC. If it is seen as problematic to even suggest a potential 
decrease in the total amount of official reserves, perhaps a smarter alternative would be to 
begin taking some of the excess official reserves (i.e., those  above and beyond what is 
reasonably needed for precautionary purposes) to invest in the growth of certain strategic 
sectors and to acquire hard assets overseas, rather than letting the stockpile of Western 
government debts grow in perpetuity. This  may mean enlarging the roles of SWFs in 
managing Asia's excess official reserves. 
In the post-crisis era, another key question faced by SWFs is what level of risk is really 
manageable and/or hedgeable for any outsized net exporter of capital? How does one 
maintain the value of assets denominated in currencies that have  a  potential risk of 
debasement? Also, is there any practical solution to address the economic, financial, and 
political implications of massive foreign exchange hedging transactions? If it is not feasible 
for Asian institutions to rely on operating defensively, then perhaps the practical alternative is 
for them to operate  offensively, by looking for allocation policies that will maximize the 
possibilities  of stimulating global growth and therefore recovery. Ultimately, only when a 
credible Asian alternative is available can Asian public surpluses be invested in Asian assets 
instead of Western government bonds as a  means of  restoring  the global balance of 
payments. This calls for Asian SWFs to play a role in the growth and development of Asian 
financial markets in general, and of Asian bond markets in particular. 
3.3  Potential Reactions from Western Institutions 
Is the simple solution of agreeing to a more flexible exchange rate regime a practical one? 
What are the potential financial consequences for Western governments in dire need of debt 
financing, if all of a sudden certain effectively pegged Asian currencies are allowed to float? 
Moreover, saving, or lack thereof, is a social behavior that is unlikely to respond to 
regulations or government policies alone. Without the growth of net savings to pay off 
national debts, the imposition of stringent fiscal and tax policies in the midst of a recession is 
a proven recipe for electoral failure. After all, can Western governments only do so much to 
encourage savings and investment amongst their greying populations? 
There are no hard and fast answers to these difficult policy questions. One thing is certain: to 
cope  in the current environment, Western institutions must go beyond PRC-bashing and 
better  coordinate their policy responses with Asian SWFs. In particular, there is  ample 
recognition  within policy circles that Asian SWFs in effect financed the rescues of many 
Western banking institutions, despite massive political pressures from their domestic 
populations. Yet, some of the countries represented are notably absent in the G20 post-
crisis process and they have enjoyed limited upside benefits from financing rescue 
packages. Until there is an effective solution to what may be seen as a one-sided situation, 
there will be negative implications for Western institutions that may have future needs for 
emergency financing from Asian SWFs. ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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4.  SWFS AS MAJOR INVESTORS AFTER THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
In the new global financial landscape, the historical and geographical preference for market 
liquidity still lingers in the West, while the ultimate concentration of surplus wealth has now 
shifted toward the East. Such cross-border capital flows create a variety of new market 
realities for SWFs as major post-crisis investors. 
4.1  Size 
The massive size of the SWFs creates two issues: 
1.  Whether there may be too many SWFs and/or they are too big (as a percentage of 
aggregate official reserves) and thus they create potential for the Dutch disease. Even if the 
proceeds are invested overseas, today’s global business environment means the money will 
eventually find a way to flow back to Asia. There may also be a need for countries to define 
the level of official reserves required for precautionary needs, beyond which only the excess 
should be invested in a SWF.  
2.  If there are too many SWFs and/or they are too big, eventually the net flow into investable 
instruments will erode the aggregated returns (the total amount of economic rent that flows 
from aggregated global economic activities) available to everyone. One may argue that this 
is not necessarily true, based on the successful track records of large SWFs. Large SWFs, 
such as the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) and Temasek Holdings, 
have proven to be able to produce returns that are competitive  with  their smaller 
counterparts. In addition, there may be a logical inconsistency in automatically assuming that 
investment inflows by SWFs will drive down  the total amount of  alpha  available to all 
investors. Their investments are often of such sizes that, if their holdings work out, the 
returns will lift the entire market, and therefore the typical liquid market benchmark portfolios 
will benefit as well. So, the real issue here is the appropriate choice of a  performance 
yardstick for SWFs. 
4.2  Strategic Agendas and Political Realities 
There is significant heterogeneity among SWFs with respect to their investment objectives. 
As instruments of the state, many of them have strategic agendas that  must  also  bear 
political realities in mind. Unlike commercial hedge funds or mutual funds, where the 
investment objective is to seek the best risk-adjusted returns, SWFs serve the nation and 
support the state economy. Operators must be realistic about the fact that a certain level of 
drawdowns might lead to a public outcry, or that one or two failed investments may test the 
limits of public patience regardless of how successful the fund has been. This has been a 
particularly sensitive issue for some Asian SWFs since the financial crisis, due to the highly 
visible initial losses that followed the bailing out of certain Western financial institutions. 
 
4.3  Balance Sheet Characteristics 
Compared to commercial institutions, SWFs also have different balance  sheet 
characteristics. For instance, during the financial crisis, SWFs were able to act as a liquidity 
provider for certain assets sold in distress without regular mark-to-market. Therefore, using 
the same set of performance measures for SWFs, such as outperformance against 
traditional liquid market benchmarks, may not be entirely appropriate. In addition, the type of 
hard assets that make investment sense to SWFs are the ones that facilitate economic 
growth and generate steady incomes, e.g., long-term commodity contracts, intercontinental ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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rail networks, or mega-sized real estate deals. These investment deals may not have any 
liquid comparables available to construct performance benchmarks. 
4.4  Change in Management Strategies 
Since the  onset of the financial crisis, the public (in Western societies in particular) has 
become slightly more open to the idea of state ownership as a means to ensure the stability 
of the banking system. At the same time, there has been  a structural change in fund 
operations. Before the crisis, there was a trend toward SWFs trying to adopt the operation 
strategies of commercial funds, essentially trying to mimic the operations of a handful of 
trillion-dollar-sized fund managers. During the crisis, some SWFs found out the hard way 
that such strategies might not have fully considered low-probability but high-impact tail 
events such as the crisis itself. Increasingly, their management thinking and risk 
management techniques have begun to move away from those of the commercial funds and 
to focus more on macro issues, systematic risk, and stabilizing roles. 
4.5  Regulatory Environment 
First, will Western-style, post-crisis regulations, such as the Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act  (2009), present threats or opportunities to Asia? The  tension 
around this issue has been most prominently displayed in the recent saga of the new hedge 
fund regulations proposed by the European Union—determined Asian investors, irritated by 
“unequal” treatment,  are  looking to find ways around these  proposed regulations. While 
there are obvious arguments in favor of uniformity in market regulations, tax laws,  and 
accounting frameworks, the more realistic question in any region as diverse as Asia (in 
terms of differing levels of financial sophistication) is which subset of regulations can be 
effectively harmonized? 
This is not a hypothetical question. Asia will  eventually  respond to the lack of its own 
settlement currency. In the end, it will come up with either a single dominant currency or 
some form of currency basket. Like the European Monetary Union, the first stop on the Asian 
path to an eventual monetary union will be a form of economic union, in which there must be 
some degree of harmonization of financial and economic rules in the region. 
Some SWFs still complain that they face too many restrictions on their activities, such as the 
security review requirements laid down by the US’ Committee on Foreign Investment. While 
many western societies still find foreign state ownership of their companies repulsive, some 
SWFs  are increasingly vocal that they are getting a one-sided deal. However, both the 
investor and the investee must find a win-win balance if any arrangements are to create 
long-term mutual benefits. As long as such investments can meet adequate state security 
protection  requirements,  and the SWFs primarily act as financial investors, there is no 
reason to leave any opaque approval processes—which clearly do not help when there is a 
need to launch emergency rescues—in place. Otherwise, SWFs will be forced to invest only 
as passive investors or by using “blind trusts”. 
Finally, researchers must also account for the cultural dimension when answering such 
policy questions, because there are deep-seated differences in the way Asians define and 
respond to long-term risk. Patience for accepting long-term risk may have the unintended 
consequences of creating herd mentality and potential misallocation on a large, systematic 
scale. In the extreme, Asia's aversion to making structural shifts in response to short-term 
market fluctuations may spread the “Japan problem” to other Asian countries in decades to 
come,  i.e.,  where  accumulated wealth is not able to  supply the goods and services to 
support a rapidly aging population, partly because of traditional saving and spending 
patterns. ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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5.  EVALUATING RECENT DIRECT INVESTMENTS MADE 
BY SWFS IN ASIA 
Since the recent financial crisis, SWFs have emerged as dominant players in the global 
financial market by injecting large amounts of capital into distressed financial institutions. On 
one hand, SWFs are large players in the market with the strategic advantage of long 
investment horizons and no imminent calls for capital. This allows them to sit out longer in 
market downturns or even  to trade against market trends. On the other hand, SWF 
investments may increase market volatility because of their collective size. In this section, 
we examine the basic trends in SWF investment before and after the financial crisis. 
Specifically, we study two aspects of SWF investment: first, we explore the extent to which 
SWFs  act as a stabilizing force in uncertain markets by studying changes in investment 
styles among the major Asian SWFs before and after the crisis; second, we reevaluate the 
performance of SWFs by factor attribution. Although any conclusions are only suggestive at 
this stage, given the preliminary nature of our data, the results raise important questions 
about major trends in the investment strategies of SWFs. 
Previous studies in the small but growing literature on sovereign wealth funds have focused 
on the price impacts and return performances of SWF investments. Most of the empirical 
studies have been hampered by the lack of publicly available data. Using a hand-collected 
sample of 166 SWF investment and divestment transactions from 1990 to 2009, Sun and 
Hesse (2009) found positive event period returns for SWF investments and little negative 
impact for their divestments. They thus conclude that there is no evidence of a significant 
destabilizing effect from SWF investments. Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2009) find similar 
positive announcement returns. We argue that examining the short-term price impacts of 
SWF investments is an indirect approach to studying their stabilization effects. 
5.1  Data 
The data used for this study comes from professional information providers that combine 
information on companies worldwide. We include the largest ten SWFs in Asia. Among them 
are the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the Australian Government Future Fund, the China 
Investment Corporation, China SAFE Investment, the Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation (GIC), the Kuwait Investment Authority, the  Libyan Investment Authority, the 
PRC’s  National Social Security Fund, the  Qatar Investment Authority,  and Temasek 
Holdings. We retrieved 406 direct investment announcements for these funds from January 
2005 to July 2010. We eliminated entries with missing announcement dates.
5
Table 1 describes the SWFs included in this study and the number of their  direct 
investments  in the sample. Table 2 describes the distribution of the sample by year  of 
transaction and industry. We must point out that the two SWFs from Singapore, the GIC and 
Temasek Holdings, are the two most active funds in this study, with the greatest number of 
investment transactions in the sample. For this reason, we focus solely on these two funds 
for part of our analysis. 
  The final 
sample consists of data relating to 126 investment transactions. 
                                                 
5 These missing dates could be hand filled by searching for relevant news announcements. This is left for future 
revisions of this paper. ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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 Table 1: Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Study 
  Country   Sovereign 
Wealth Fund  
 Inception   Funding Source   Funding 
Level (US$ 
billion)  








 1976    Oil    $627    10 
PRC   SAFE 
Investment 
Company  
 1997   Non-
Commodity  
 $347.1    5 
PRC  China 
Investment 
Corporation  
 2007   Non-
Commodity  
 $288.8    16 




 1981   Non-
Commodity  
 $247.5    23 
Kuwait   Kuwait 
Investment 
Authority  
 1953    Oil    $202.8    7 




 2000   Non-
Commodity  
 $146.5    1 
Singapore   Temasek 
Holdings  
 1974   Non-
Commodity  
 $133    46 
Libya   Libyan 
Investment 
Authority  
 2006    Oil    $70    3 
Qatar   Qatar 
Investment 
Authority  
 2005    Oil    $65    13 
Australia   Australian 
Future Fund  
 2000   Non-
Commodity  
 $54.8    2 
  
Note: PRC = People’s Republic of China 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Sample by Year of Transaction and Industry 
      2005    2006    2007    2008    2009    2010 
Financial 
Sector  
 1    3    14    15    11    3 
Oil    2    1    1    0    2    5 
Others    11    12    14    10    16    5 
Total    14    16    29    25    29    13 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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Table 3: Distribution of the Sample for GIC and Temasek 
      2005    2006    2007    2008    2009    2010 
Number  of 
investments  
 10    13    19    10    9    5 
LTM 
Revenue 
(US$ million)  
 1,897    5,758    11,137    11,688    26,899    4,348 
LFQ Asset 
(US$ million)  
 2,914    262,030    509,372    750,067    421,817    14,294 
LFQ Debt 
(US$ million)  
 1,332    34,825    182,723    264,174    10,512    4,276 
Notes: LTM = Last Twelve Months; LFQ = Last Fiscal Quarter 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 3 summarizes the direct investments made by the GIC and Temasek in the period 
under study. We observe a trend of increasing size of direct investments up to the onset of 
the financial crisis and a steady decrease afterwards. This stands in sharp contrast to the 
supposedly stabilizing role of SWFs. 
We also observe a noticeable increase in the direct investments of SWFs in the financial 
sector over the years (Figure 3). While it is true that during the financial crisis distressed 
financial institutions sought help and received capital injections from large Asian sovereign 
wealth funds, active investments in the financial sector started well before the subprime 
meltdown. 
We also wish to analyze the SWFs’ direct investment in domestic versus foreign markets. 
Previous studies have  identified major differences in the investment strategies of Asian 
SWFs  when compared to funds from other parts of the world. When studying the  direct 
investments  made by  the  major SWFs between 1984 and 2007, Bernstein, Lerner,  and 
Schoar (2009) found that 75.7% of Asian funds' direct investments were within Asia, with 
37.4% of investments being made in the home nation of the fund. In contrast, Middle Eastern 
funds invested mostly in other regions, such as in Europe, North America, and Australia, with 
only 9.0% of investments being made in their home countries.
6
                                                 
6 Many SWFs are not supposed to invest in assets located in their own countries by mandate, but such 
restrictions are increasingly problematic as businesses are increasingly global in nature. Total isolation is neither 
practical nor feasible. In addition, some SWFs have origins as investment vehicles holding stated-owned 
companies. While some degree of diversification is often seen as desirable, for strategic reasons they are 
expected to maintain a certain level of state ownership in those domestic companies. 
 Western SWFs, which are 
much smaller in general than the Middle Eastern funds, invest mostly in the West, with 94% 
of investment occurring in the home country. The capital flows of major SWFs undoubtedly 
have major implications for the regional economy in which the funds invest. Funds that 
invest heavily in the domestic economy may be more sensitive to the social needs of the 
nation. Whether this regional investment pattern has changed and, if so, how the changes 
correlate with overall market uncertainty and global political economy remain interesting and 
important questions. ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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Figure 3: SWF Investment in the Financial vs. Non-Financial Sector, 2005–2010 
(%) 
 
    
  
Source: Authors’ calculations 




    
 Source: Authors’ calculations 
5.2  Evidence: Direct Investments in Periods under Different Market 
Regimes 
This empirical analysis assesses how these large Asian SWF investments react to different 
market regimes. Before the financial crisis, SWFs were often viewed as a threat to global 
financial stability. These fears seem both exaggerated and somewhat unjustified, especially 
since  SWFs  have recently injected large amounts of capital into distressed financial 
institutions. As argued in the previous sections, such rescuing acts can also be thought of as ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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natural hedges for these mega-sized SWFs. As a preliminary analysis, we use the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX) as a measure of market uncertainty 
and examine the timing of SWF investments under different market conditions. We find that 
the correlation between the number of SWF investments and the VIX index (Figure 5) is 40% 
during the pre-crisis period (January 2005 to August 2008) and –19% during the crisis period 
(September 2008 to December 2009). 




Source: Authors’ calculations 
We also identify a visible difference between the investments made in public versus private 
companies before and after the crisis (Figures 6 and 7). In general, private equity markets 
have much higher information asymmetry than public markets. Differences in institutional 
strategies may be more pronounced in the private equity market. In addition, as argued by 
David Swensen, the Chief Investment Officer at Yale University's Endowment Fund, private 
equity markets may offer larger potential gains to superior research and these gains are not 
easily competed away as is the case in the more liquid public markets. Perpetually-lived 
institutions such as SWFs have strategic advantages in the private equity markets over their 
shorter-horizon competitors. In a  period of high market uncertainty, SWFs reduce their 
overall investments and tend to shy away from private companies in particular. The 
correlation between the VIX and the number of investments in private companies is as high 
as 42% in the before-crisis period (January 2005 to August 2008), yet it becomes  –7% 
between September 2008 and May 2010. Investments in public companies are much less 
correlated with market uncertainty. 
In particular, we see from Figure 8 that the GIC and Temasek substantially reduced their 
investments in the public sector after the financial crisis and focused more on the private 
sector instead, in line with the “Swensen prescription." 
Understanding the long-term price impacts and macroeconomic implications would require a 
much more comprehensive study with a broader set of data on stock returns, transaction 
volumes, exchange rates, and capital inflows. Although it is hard to draw firm conclusions for 
overall global and regional financial stability based on our sample of 126investment 
transactions, we find some evidence that the SWFs may have changed investment styles 
before and after the crisis. However, we have found limited objective evidence that these 
SWFs provide global financial stability in periods  of high market uncertainty, especially 
during the recent crisis. This is not to suggest that SWFs have not contributed to global 
financial stability when compared to the proverbial alternative of “doing nothing”—we are ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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simply stating that no objective evidence has been found based on analysis of the available 
data, given the lack of objective data available on the alternative scenario of “doing nothing.” 
 




Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Source: Authors’ calculations   
5.3  Evidence: Performance and Factor Attributions 
As argued in Park (2008b), the risks and returns of SWFs may have large repercussions for 
a state's economic stability. SWFs are set up by governments to seek excess returns for the 
nation's foreign reserve surpluses, some of which originate from foreign exchange market 
interventions by central banks. Such interventions often result in the central banks' 
borrowing foreign currencies from the commercial banking system. If these investments go 
sour, commercial banks may also suffer the consequences. In this way, according to Park, 
the performance of SWFs becomes an important source of regional financial stability. 
We are not in perfect agreement with Park's logic, but his policy insights seem generally 
valid. In the next section, we wish to evaluate the performance of the investments of Asian 
SWFs before and after the crisis. Furthermore, we investigate whether SWFs can be seen to 
withdraw their investments from more liquid markets, such as the equity market, and shift 
their investments to alternative markets in periods of high market uncertainty.  
6.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS ON POSSIBLE “ALPHA 
OVERCROWDING”, LEADING TO RETHINKING OF THE 
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES OF SWFS 
In a liquid and active marketplace for publicly traded securities, potential gains from 
fundamental research or speculative profits are easily competed away by a large number of 
investors. Long-term mandates and an absence of current cash liabilities allow SWFs to 
focus on alternative asset classes with long verification horizons. Furthermore, as pointed 
out in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), markets may stay irrational longer than an investor can 
stay solvent due to various limits to arbitrage. This also gives SWFs a strategic benefit over 
smaller investors who cannot afford to sit through market downturns. 
The large size of the funds is another advantage which provides economies of scale, the 
ability to actively influence corporate management, and greater bargaining power. Indeed, 
Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2009) find that SWFs adopt an active role in their target ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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firms. In addition, some argue that the management of SWFs comes with a stronger public 
service ethos which helps to mitigate the agency problems that usually challenge delegated 
investment management. All these comparative advantages of SWFs provide a basis for the 
potential development of strategies that could contribute to fund performance. 
Indeed, the outstanding track record of the two most successful SWFs from Singapore, the 
GIC and Temasek Holdings—the market value of Temasek grew by 18% on an annual 
compounding basis between 1974 and 2006—led many other Asian countries to set up their 
own SWFs. Existing evidence on the overall performances of SWFs, however, is  rather 
disappointing. Recent studies show essentially zero or negative long-run performances of 
SWF investments (Bortolotti, Fotak, Megginson, and Miracky 2008; Kotter and Lel 2010; 
Dewenter, Han and Malatesta 2009). In a report on the performance evaluation of the 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund, Ang, Goetzmann,  and Schaefer (2009) also 
concluded  that active portfolio management had  played  a very small role in the fund's 
performance to date. Much of the fund's returns came from exposures to risk factors. 
Given the multiple strategic benefits of SWFs, what is driving what seems to be the long-
term underperformance of certain SWF investments?  If  the  Efficient Market Hypothesis 
holds, security prices reflect all the information about their fundamentals. Active 
management, therefore, has little potential to add to the value of the fund. It is impossible for 
any investor to beat the market. Over the years, researchers have identified various market 
frictions that limit market efficiency, such as trading constraints, information costs, agency 
problems, and capital restrictions. Existing empirical evidence, however, shows that it is rare 
for an active manager to consistently deliver excess risk-adjusted returns. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis has focused on whether security prices will deviate from 
their fundamental economic values. An equally important question from an investor's 
perspective is whether, if the market is not perfectly efficient, active management can take 
advantage of this  inefficiency. This question is referred to as the “agency problem”  as 
proposed by Ross (1973): in a principal(investor)-agent(manager) setting, which incentive 
structures will result in the principal sharing a meaningful portion of the agent's gains? This 
is a common challenge faced by delegated investment management. In the case of SWFs, 
these funds are state-owned institutions which will be backed by their respective 
governments in the event of unfavorable contingencies. This may create a moral hazard 
problem in the sense that the fund may take unduly high risks in pursuit of high returns, 
under the assumption that the government will always bail them out when things go wrong. 
Such  a  moral hazard problem,  along with inadequate risk management,  can result in 
excessive risk-taking behavior. One often-cited example (which may or may not be the result 
of inadequate risk management) is the US$3 billion investment by the China Investment 
Corporation in Blackstone in May 2007, which eventually lost 70% of its value. Along the 
same lines, Le Borgnes and Medas (2008) studied the performances of SWFs in the Pacific 
Island countries  and suggested  that weak public financial management systems, lack of 
spending controls,  and,  in some cases, rigid operational rules may explain the poor 
performances of these funds in achieving their investment goals. 
6.1  Berk-Green Alpha as Applied to the Sovereign Wealth 
Management Context 
Aside from agency costs, moral hazards, and other frictions in organizational structures, a 
highly influential paper by Berk and Green (2004) argued that in an economy with rational, 
profit-maximizing investors, active management does not deliver excess returns, even by a 
skilled manager who may initially generate superior returns. Their model allows for some 
managers to have greater talents and be better managers than others. These managers are 
rewarded for information production and keep economic rents for their skills. However, small 
investors compete away all the excess returns. In equilibrium, any gains from active 
management do not flow to the investors. ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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One underlying assumption behind this theory is that the managers are limited by investment 
technology that has diminishing returns to scale: the managerial ability to generate excess 
returns cannot be effectively employed at an arbitrarily large scale. When the amount of 
money under management reaches a certain size, additional flows to the fund reduce the 
expected return of the overall portfolio. Such an assumption is consistent with the observed 
decentralization of the professional money management industry. In fact, institutions are 
known to divest from investment managers in order to avoid “concentration risk” even when 
the underlying investments are individual funds that are separate legal entities. 
Using a comprehensive set of hedge fund data over a ten-year period (January 1995 to 
December 2004), Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008) found no detectable alphas in 
the sample period. In addition, they found that capital inflows to a fund led to lower alpha, 
and lower alpha persistence, which is consistent with Berk and Green’s (2004) prediction. 
The findings by Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008) were particularly striking in light of 
the fact that the estimated net alpha to the investor was getting visibly smaller at the same 
time as the hedge fund industry was going through an explosive growth period. This gives 
some empirical credibility to the general idea that there may be a finite amount of alpha 
available to all investors. The fact that investors of the size of SWFs are dabbling in hedge 
funds, particularly the trading-oriented ones, may create a no-win situation for all investors 
(Lee 2010). This  theory has important implications regarding the size of SWFs. Do the 
massive volumes of assets under management eliminate the potential gains to be made 
from active management? Will optimal asset allocation solve this problem? 
6.2  The Case of Temasek Holdings 
To partially answer the questions  posed above, we have  constructed  a test case by 
analyzing the performance of Temasek Holdings. The performance graph shown in Figure 9 
is taken from information made public by Temasek Holdings in its 2010 Annual Report.  
Temasek is known to have a set of internal allocation targets based on a combination of 
40% in Asia (excluding Japan and Singapore), 30% in Singapore, 20% in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies, and 10% in the rest of the 
world, with a focus on Latin America and Africa. Based on these internal targets, we used a 
basket of liquid-market proxies, as shown in Table 5, to construct a benchmark performance 
time series. Latin America and Africa are considered to be primarily a resource “play," thus 
we feel that the most appropriate liquid-market proxy in such a case would be the Goldman 
Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI). In addition, we further optimize the asset allocation of the 
composite benchmarks using a commercial optimizer, based on the two schemes as 
described in Lee (2006) and Lee, Rogal, and Weinberger (2010), using an allocation range 
of 0% to 40%. These approaches are consistent with the typical asset allocation 
methodologies used by long-term investors to manage real-life multi-asset portfolios. The 
resulting optimized allocations, as shown in Table 4, are found to show superior return-to-
drawdown characteristics. Figure 10  is constructed to further compare the performance 
based on the balance sheet values of Temasek (published in its Annual Report) with these 
synthetic benchmarks. We believe that balance sheet values give a reasonably accurate 
picture of Temasek's net asset values (NAVs) in a manner consistent with the typical NAV 
reporting done by any commercial institutional asset manager, such as a hedge fund. All 
performance figures are scaled to 100 at the end of March 2005, which coincides with the 
fiscal year end of Temasek Holdings. 
Some interesting observations from Figure 10 include: 
 1.   Prior to 2008—There is almost no observable alpha in Temasek's portfolio before the 
dramatic events of 2008.  
2.   Gains in 2008—Since our analysis was based on a straightforward currency translation 
without any currency hedging, and Temasek's portfolio was likely to have some degree of ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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currency hedging, the gains in 2008 may be partially due to Temasek gaining from currency 
hedging after the significant strengthening of the Singapore dollar.  
3.   Drawdown in 2009—Notice that Temasek's drawdown is significantly milder than its 
synthetic benchmarks based on liquid-market proxies. However, a meaningful portion of 
Temasek's portfolio is private, and Temasek's fiscal-year-end results were not released until 
August of 2009, by which time the markets had experienced a meaningful recovery. It is 
certainly not unheard of for privately-held investments to report retroactive valuations to 
reflect improved market sentiments, although such a  practice may not necessarily be 
reflected in this case. We are simply posing a fair question based on common market 
practice.  
4.   Rebounds in 2010—Notice how the public markets did not recover their full losses from 
the end of March in 2008 to the end of March in 2010, while Temasek did. It would be 
interesting to further attribute the superior performance of Temasek to: i) currency gains; ii) 
any possible “cushioning" in valuations by privately-held investments; or iii) superior alpha 
selection. 
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Figure 10: Temasek Holdings’ Balance Sheet Values Relative to Synthetic Benchmarks, Mar 2005–Sep 2010 


















6.3  In Search of Appropriate Performance Measures for SWFs 
In light of the facts and analysis above it seems puzzling that,  with all the comparative 
advantages of SWFs over other investors in the market, there is no significant evidence that 
SWFs deliver positive long-run overperformance. Although there are potential drawbacks to 
each of the distinctive features of these government-owned funds, we feel that one problem 
may lie in not having the right set of performance measures to evaluate the unique nature 
and purpose of SWF investments. 
SWFs are set up to serve a nation by preserving wealth across generations. Compared to 
commercially-delegated investment institutions, whose only purpose is to seek the highest 
available financial returns for their investors, SWFs generally have to operate according to a 
slightly different political agenda that provides strategic benefits to the nation's economy. 
These investments by all means serve the funds' only investors—the people of the nation—
however, the financial profits that come along with these strategic benefits may not be 
apparent in a short-term horizon, over which most of the existing performance evaluation 
methodologies are applied. While the potential long-run financial benefits of these strategic 
investments are hard to measure, at the minimum any short-term performance measures 
should not penalize SWFs for meeting these longer-term strategic objectives. In particular, 
the long-horizon nature of SWF investments should be taken into special consideration for 
fund managers' performance evaluations. Otherwise, the finite tenure of fund managers and 
endowment monitors will only encourage significant short-term risk-averse behaviors, which 
may erode the strategic benefits of being able to invest with  long-term horizons. Such 
problems should be properly addressed when searching for suitable performance evaluation 
measures for fund managers responsible for SWF investments. 
From a pure financial economics perspective, the massive size of SWF investments creates 
another challenge for performance evaluation of “active” management. “Active” management 
can be measured by the difference between the returns on a fund and the returns on the 
benchmark portfolio. If the fund manager passively invests according to the benchmark, the 
“active return” of the fund would be zero. Traditional performance measures are 
benchmarked against the market of liquid securities. During the financial crisis, these 
systematic factors, which explain a significant component of performance, fared very poorly. 
In addition, the massive size of SWF investments may have a large price impact on these 
benchmark measures. 
For these reasons, the authors propose the following set of principles to construct a fair 
performance benchmark for SWFs: 
1.  Discourage SWFs from simply piling into equities or any other “vogue" investments;  
2.  Encourage “alpha" investments that can promote national economic development;  
3.  Encourage investments in sectors complementary to national balance sheets to create 
natural diversification effects;  
4.  Discourage domination of benchmark setting by countries with large public reserves (e.g., 
the PRC), as this may lead  countries with smaller public reserves to  feel that such a 
benchmark is irrelevant to their needs; and 
5.  Base measures on reasonably liquid assets with regular mark-to-market values.  
One possible approach is to create a peer benchmark by value-weighing the asset 
allocations of all major SWFs. SWFs smaller than, say, US$100 billion in net asset values 
will be rescaled to US$100 billion to ensure that they are  given a meaningful minimum 
weight. In each asset class, a fixed number (e.g., 100) of “investable" assets that are most 
heavily invested in by SWFs will be selected to represent the performance of that asset ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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class. Doing so will construct a peer performance index that satisfies most if not all of the 
conditions stated above. 
7.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In theory, every country in the world can print a certain amount of domestic currency and 
exchange it for foreign currencies in order to build up an official reserve. Such pools can be 
used by each central bank to facilitate more efficient settlements of day-to-day cross-border 
transactions. 
As long as these pools of official reserves are kept away from general circulation in the real 
economy—in the past official reserves were usually invested only in government bonds—the 
act of printing money to create such pools should have limited inflationary  impacts on 
domestic economies when governments are simply holding each other's bonds. 
The picture portrayed above is distorted in today's world because:  i) some debtor 
governments have decided to use the money raised from the selling of bonds to other 
central banks to finance massive fiscal deficits; ii) the net-saver countries may also decide to 
use their reserves to invest in tangible assets instead of holding government bonds; and iii) 
one key “saver" region in the world has yet to offer a credible anchor currency that central 
banks from other regions can hold as a store of value. This combination results in monetary 
expansion in the real economy. Massive public surpluses among Asian countries have 
allowed certain governments to run unsustainable fiscal deficits  and,  realistically, this 
situation cannot be improved upon overnight. In fact, it could be problematic to even suggest 
a potential slowdown in the purchase of certain Western government debts. 
Accordingly, our policy recommendations in response to the evolving roles of Asian 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the post-crisis world are: 
1.   There may be a certain optimal size for each SWF—Asian SWFs present a smart 
means through which a portion of a state’s excess official reserves (i.e., above and beyond 
what is reasonably needed for precautionary purposes) can be used to invest in growth in 
certain strategic sectors and to acquire hard assets overseas, instead of letting the stockpile 
of Western government debts grow in perpetuity. However, there is a real risk of the Dutch 
disease if SWFs are allowed to grow too big,  especially since “ring-fencing” domestic 
investments
7
2.   Focus on asset allocation, not alpha—A recent study based on the historical return 
patterns of the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund found limited evidence (if any) that Norway 
had  benefited from any alpha-seeking activities. The fund's returns appear to be driven 
primarily by asset allocation. This observation is consistent with theories and evidence on 
the overcrowding of “alpha,” in that state investors at sizes that represent significant portions 
of the entire market cannot be expected to significantly outperform the market itself. 
 may be impractical in today's global business environment. 
3.   Focus on sectors complementary to national balance sheets—Many Asian countries 
are manufacturing powerhouses that are naturally “short” resources and “long” the global 
trade settlement currency (as a result of producing and selling their manufacturing goods). 
Their appropriate diversification policy, from a national balance sheet perspective, is to buy 
resources as well as intangible assets. Until certain market breakpoints are reached, it is a 
natural outcome for resource-rich countries and manufacturing powerhouses to accumulate 
large public surpluses and to invest them in debt and equity papers issued by developed 
economies. 
                                                 
7 This refers to the investment practice of avoiding all domestic investments. In today’s global business 
environment, doing so may be impractical because an investment entity may still be exposed to domestic 
activities by multinational company with many different global operation centers. ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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4.   Manage drawdown from the long side of the balance sheet—In theory, SWFs are 
large players in the market with the strategic advantage of long investment horizons and no 
imminent calls for capital. This allows them to sit out longer in market downturns, or even to 
trade against market trends. In practice, some SWFs learned the hard way that there could 
be heavy political costs when facing massive drawdowns, regardless of whether the 
drawdowns were within expectations, and regardless of whether the funds were successful 
in recovering from the drawdowns. SWFs  also cannot engage in typical trading-oriented 
hedging activities because the notional amounts that they would be required to take short 
positions in might be large enough to crash the market. Therefore, SWFs must focus on 
managing their potential drawdowns from the long side of their balance sheets. 
5.   Define SWFs' de facto role as global lender of last resort—One pragmatic hedging 
technique that can be pursued by an SWF is to act as the global lender of last resort, in 
order to avoid any potential collapse of the global economy. There are practical advantages 
in defining such roles for Asian official institutions, as well as the potential responsibilities 
and obligations involved. Certain basic criteria must be met before launching any rescue—
unlike the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Board, a collection of independent 
Asian official institutions may not all agree on how best to make certain difficult choices 
between moral hazards  and long-term economic malaise. Also, SWFs must see some 
potential upside benefits from financing rescue packages before they will agree to finance 
future rescue packages for Western institutions. 
6.   Develop suitable performance measures—Traditional performance measures based 
on outperformance relative to a global market benchmark often fail to consider the following: 
the size of investments that may have significant market impacts, flexibility to invest in illiquid 
assets, long-term investment horizons,  and  diversification/strategic benefits to the overall 
state economy. There is a need to reconcile the long-term nature of SWF investments 
against certain existing liquid market benchmarks, which cater to the shorter-term horizons 
of commercial fund managers’ performance evaluations and career concerns. 
7.    Develop a credible Asian asset  market—Ultimately, only when a credible Asian 
alternative is available can Asian public surpluses be invested in Asian assets instead of 
Western government bonds,  and in this  way  possibly  restore the global balance of 
payments. This calls for Asian SWFs to play a leading role in the growth and development of 
Asian financial markets in general, and Asian bond markets in particular. 
8.   Coordinate the relevant post-crisis regulatory responses—To succeed in the current 
environment, Western institutions must go beyond PRC-bashing and better coordinate their 
policy responses with Asian SWFs. Western-style, post-crisis regulations can present both 
threats and opportunities to Asia. This tension is most prominently displayed in the recent 
saga regarding the new hedge fund regulations proposed by the European Union, wherein 
determined Asian investors, irritated by “unfair” treatments, are searching for ways to work 
around  the  proposed EU regulations. While there are obvious arguments in favor of 
uniformity in market regulations, tax laws, and accounting frameworks, the more realistic 
question in any region as diverse as Asia (in terms of differing  levels of financial 
sophistication) is which subset of regulations can be effectively harmonized. 
9.    Increase  transparency of security  regulations that restrict  state  investments—
Some SWFs still complain that they face too many restrictions arising from vaguely worded 
security regulations. While many western societies still find foreign state ownership of their 
companies repulsive, some SWFs are increasingly vocal that they are getting one-sided 
deals. As long as such investments can meet adequate state security protection 
requirements and the SWFs primarily act as financial investors, there is no reason to leave 
any opaque approval processes in place. These also clearly do not help when there is a 
need to launch emergency rescues. 
10.   Foster the public's better understanding of the important roles played by SWFs—
It is often impossible for any rescuer to time their intervention at the precise bottom of a ADBI Working Paper 287    Lee and Wang 
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collapsing market, so the post-rescue market volatility often leads to a  public outcry 
regarding the “misuse” of public coffers by the rescuer, however well-intended their initial 
actions may have been.. These misperceptions limit SWFs' freedom to act decisively during 
crises, and they could be partially corrected by educating the public about the important 
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